

**Life After Welfare:
A Look At Sanctioned Families**

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Executive Summary

One of the most radically different features of Maryland's reformed welfare system is its use of the full family sanction whereby, for non-compliance with certain program requirements, the entire family's cash assistance grant is terminated. The full family sanction option became available to states under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). Previously, federal law did not generally permit states to terminate benefits to an entire household on the basis of an adult's non-compliant behavior. Under pre-PRWORA, waiver-based welfare reform, several states experimented with full family sanctions and a few reports on their experiences have been issued. For the most part though states which elected the full family sanctioning option under PRWORA had to do so with limited historical experience to guide them and virtually no empirical data to help them predict what the magnitude and effects of full family sanctioning might be. Given the newness and severity of this penalty, however, it seems imperative that states which adopted this policy option examine how that policy has been working.

Thanks to a long-standing research partnership between the Maryland Department of Human Resources and the University of Maryland School of Social Work, we are able to empirically examine this and other welfare reform issues. Since the outset of reform in Maryland (October, 1996) the School has been carrying out a large, longitudinal study, *Life After Welfare*, which tracks the experiences of several thousand families who have left the cash assistance rolls. The present report uses data from the *Life After Welfare* study and universe data from the state's welfare information

management systems to examine the use and effects of full family sanctions for non-compliance with work and non-cooperation with child support during the first 18 months of reform (October, 1996 - March, 1998). Key points arising from this analysis include the following.

1. Overall, few Maryland families lost cash assistance because of a full family sanction for non-compliance with work or child support requirements. Intra-state variations in sanctioning rates are evident, however, and the rate of sanctioning has increased over time.

During the first 18 months of reform, only 7.0% of all case closures resulted from full family sanctioning. This low rate of sanctioning is good news. It confirms that the dramatic drop in Maryland's welfare caseloads has not been a result of this new, stricter sanctioning policy. At the same time, the data show that sanction rates across the state during the first 18 months did vary widely - from a low of 2.6% of all case closures in Baltimore City to a high of 21.1% in Somerset County. Likewise, sanctioning rates did vary over time. Only 4.1% of all closures in the first six months of reform were due to sanctions, but this proportion more than doubled (to 9.1% of all closures) by the 13th through 18th months.

2. The vast majority of full family sanctions result from non-compliance with work participation requirements, rather than non-cooperation with child support. Again, however, there are intra-state differences in the relative use of these two types of full family sanctions.

Statewide, during the 18 month study period, about nine of every 10 full family sanctions (89.39%) were work sanctions. In all 24 local subdivisions work sanctions were more common than child support sanctions, but some intra-state variations in the relative use of work and child support sanctions were found. In three counties (Allegany, Frederick, Garrett), all sanctions imposed during the first 18 months were

work sanctions. Child support sanctions, though a minority of sanctions in all localities, were most prevalent in Montgomery and Wicomico counties. In these two jurisdictions during the first 18 months of the new program, child support sanctions accounted for more than one of every three full family sanctions imposed; the proportions were 49.2% (60/122) and 36.8% (21/157), respectively.

3. On several important characteristics, the profile of sanctioned families is significantly different from the profile of families who left welfare for reasons other than sanctions.

In general and on average, compared to non-sanctioned welfare leavers, sanctioned payees are younger, began having children at earlier ages, are more likely to be Caucasian and are less likely to have worked, pre-exit, in a Maryland job covered by the Unemployment Insurance system. There are no differences between the two groups in lifetime welfare use, the number of children in the assistance unit, the age of the youngest child or the proportion of cases with children under three years of age.

4. There are significant differences between sanctioned and non-sanctioned adults on all post-exit employment variables examined; on all such variables, sanctioned adults fare poorly compared to non-sanctioned adults.

Sanctioned adults are less likely (31.1%) than non-sanctioned adults (56.1%) to work in the quarter in which their welfare cases closed and, among those who did work during this period, mean quarterly earnings are significantly lower among those who were sanctioned (\$1,741.57) than among those who were not (\$2,344.41). Although the proportion of sanctioned adults who were working in UI-covered jobs increased, the same pattern prevails in the quarter after welfare case closure. Among non-sanctioned payees, 55.7% worked in such a job in the quarter after leaving welfare; for sanctioned payees, the figure was 38.4%. Similarly, mean quarterly earnings were significantly

lower among employed, sanctioned adults (\$1,648.74) than among employed adults who had left welfare for other reasons (\$2,456.60).

5. Sanctioned families are more likely than non-sanctioned families to return to cash assistance in the first few months following case closure and they tend to return more quickly than other families.

Within the first 90 days after case closure, sanctioned families are much more likely to come back on welfare than are other families; almost twice as many sanctioned families (35.2%) as non-sanctioned families (18.4%) came back on welfare in three months or less. Recidivism among sanctioned families also tends to happen very quickly; nearly one in four (24.1%) sanctioned families came back on welfare within 30 days of case closure, nearly twice the rate of very early returns (13.7%) among other families.

6. Two outcomes are most prevalent among sanctioned payees: the majority either seek and find employment immediately after case closure or come into compliance and return to cash assistance. Of the remainder, the vast majority receive Food Stamps. Others move out of state or appear to have other sources of support; in no cases, however, did families totally disappear from view.

Of the 199 sanctioned case heads (of 251 total sanctioned case heads) for whom we have follow up data, three-fifths (n=120, 60.3%) either work right after case closure (n=73) or return to welfare (n=47). Of payees who were not working and not back on welfare (n=79), the vast majority (n=68 of 79) were receiving Food Stamps in Maryland; of the remaining payees (n=11), we were able to confirm participation in Medical Assistance for four of them. Review of case narrative materials on the remaining seven cases (see pg. 40 in full report) provides some information about the post-sanction situations and resources of the remaining seven families. Some of these families situations and income sources appear to be fairly stable. Others though are

clearly facing difficult, complicated life situations which may well have interfered with their ability to comply with new welfare program requirements, especially those related to work.

Today's report is the first which, using administrative data, looks specifically at the sub-group of non-waiver based TANF Maryland welfare leavers who have experienced a full family sanction and compares them to non-sanctioned welfare leavers. To the best of our knowledge, it is one of the first such post-PRWORA studies to be released. In addition to providing some beginning descriptive information about sanctioned families, we believe the study also offers several "food for thought" items for Maryland policy-makers and program managers; though sanction policies and their practical implementation vary widely across the country, these observations may also be informative for other states.

A first observation is that sanctioned families are a heterogeneous group. At least in the first 18 months of this new policy, we find no evidence that, as some pundits predicted, long-term welfare recipients - those often thought to be "hard to serve" - have disproportionately been those who experienced a full family sanction. On the other hand, our data do suggest that cases possessing certain demographic characteristics may be more at risk to experience this penalty than others. In particular, assistance cases headed by younger women, those with little or no work experience or a history of early child-bearing may be at heightened risk. This emerging profile implies that it may be possible to do some type of front-line risk assessment and/or more intensive prevention or conciliation work with high-risk customers. We also find that for sanctioned cases the welfare spell culminating in case closure is significantly shorter

than for non-sanctioned families. Among other things, these data suggest that efforts to insure that behavioral expectations are clearly and consistently explained during the first few months of customers welfare spells might be one effective prevention strategy.

A second general point is that continued monitoring of sanctioned cases is clearly needed. Are these findings for the first 18 months of reform representative of what trends will be over time or do they more reflect start up period findings? What happens to sanctioned families over longer periods of post-exit time? Do adults keep working? Do those who return to welfare experience a subsequent sanction? Do sanction rates continue to increase over time or level off? Do local variations in sanction rates persist over time? These are all questions to which answers are needed if policy-makers are to truly understand how this policy is being implemented, who it is affecting, how effective it has been in securing customers cooperation with work and child support requirements and what happens to families on whom this penalty is imposed.

Introduction

One of the most radically different features of Maryland's approach to welfare reform, the Family Investment Program (FIP), is the so-called full family sanction whereby, for non-compliance with various program requirements, the entire family is terminated from cash assistance. The full family sanctioning option was made available to states under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, P. L. 104-193) of 1996 and has been adopted, in one form or another, by a number of states, including ours (National Governor's Association, 1999). In Maryland, the full family sanction is used, following a 30-day conciliation period, as the penalty for the first instance of non-compliance with work or child support requirements. Except in instances of intentional program violations, full family sanctioning is in sharp contrast to prior (Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC) sanctioning policy in Maryland and nationally. Previously, non-compliance resulted in a partial reduction of the welfare grant such that the non-compliant adult no longer received AFDC, but other persons in the assistance unit still could.

Several states, through waiver-based welfare reform, experimented with full family sanctions prior to passage of PRWORA and a few reports on their preliminary experiences have been published (see, for example, Kaplan 1999 or U.S. General Accounting Office, May, 1997). For the most part, however, states adopting PRWORA-based full family sanction policies have had to do so with limited historical experience to guide them. Similarly, states have had virtually no empirical data to help them predict the magnitude of sanctioning that might occur or what the effects of full family sanctioning policies might be. Given the newness and severity of full family sanctioning

and the oft-expressed concern that this policy would cause great harm to children, it seems imperative that states which elected the full family sanction option under PRWORA examine how that policy has been working.

Thanks to a long-standing research partnership between the Maryland Department of Human Resources and the University of Maryland School of Social Work, the State of Maryland is well-positioned to take a look at questions related to the full family sanctioning aspect of its redesigned cash assistance program, Temporary Cash Assistance (TCA). Specifically, since day one of welfare reform in Maryland (October 1, 1996), the School has been carrying out a large-scale, longitudinal study, *Life After Welfare*, which tracks the experiences of a random sample of several thousand families who have left the Maryland cash assistance rolls.

Many state-level welfare-leavers studies limit their samples to certain types of exiting clients (e.g., those who left welfare for work or those who left welfare and have not returned). Ours does not. It includes clients who left welfare for any reason, including those whose cases were closed due to the imposition of a full family sanction. Moreover, our sample is not restricted to families who exited welfare in a particular month or time frame; rather, each month we add more cases to our sample, such that we are tracking families who left in the early months of reform as well as those who exited later.

Today's report takes advantage of this large, longitudinal, ever-growing database and universe data from the state's welfare information management systems to examine the use and effect of full family sanctions for non-compliance with work participation or child support cooperation during the first 18 months of welfare reform in

Maryland (October 1, 1996 - March 30, 1998).¹ Because sanctioned families are a subgroup of leavers about whom there is great concern, today's paper is the first of two separate reports that we plan to issue on the topic of full family sanctions.² The second report, expected to be completed within the next few months, will focus on a special and unique group of sanctioned cases — those who were the very first cases to have this penalty imposed in Maryland.

¹ Full family sanctions are also imposed for intentional program violations and non-compliance with substance abuse requirements. During the first 18 months of reform there were 81 of the former and 10 of the latter sanctions statewide, of which 8 and 0 respectively were randomly selected into our *Life After Welfare* sample.

² Some information on sanctioned families also appears in our ongoing series of *Life After Welfare* reports, the fourth of which was issued in October 1999.

Background

Use of some type of financial sanction or penalty in cases of non-compliant or fraudulent behavior on the part of clients has long been a feature of public welfare programs in the United States. In the last few decades of the now-defunct Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the predominant approach vis-a-vis non-compliant behavior was to impose a partial sanction or grant reduction on the assistance unit. Indeed, as the U.S. General Accounting Office notes, with few exceptions prior [pre-PRWORA] federal welfare law did not allow states to terminate benefits to an entire household on the basis of sanctions for noncompliance (US GAO, May, 1997, pg.2). In general, the approach was to reduce the cash grant by the amount attributable to the offending adult. The practical effect of these policies was that, all else equal, a three person assistance unit would, while sanctioned, be entitled to receive the grant ordinarily payable to a two person assistance unit. Another general feature of the partial sanctioning approach characteristic of AFDC was that it was not time-limited. That is, families who elected to be sanctioned rather than comply with program requirements could remain in sanctioned status --receiving reduced cash benefits-- for an indefinite period of time. In addition, because of the interaction effects between AFDC and Food Stamps and AFDC and housing assistance, the net loss to the partially sanctioned household was often fairly minimal.

The effectiveness of the traditional partial, open-ended sanctioning policy under AFDC was among the many hotly-debated issues during national welfare reform discussions. Likewise, it was a hot button issue in reform deliberations in our state.

The authors of today's report participated in and observed the welfare reform design process in Maryland. In our recollection, the state's choice to adopt a full family, rather than partial, sanction policy for its new welfare program was most heavily influenced by two factors. One was program data indicating that, indeed, many partially-sanctioned AFDC families appeared to have made the choice to receive reduced benefits over extended periods of time, rather than comply with work program participation requirements. To policy makers those data provided convincing empirical support for staff assertions that partial sanctions were simply ineffective as a means of obtaining clients' cooperation with work rules.

Perhaps more compelling was front-line staff's argument that, in the new time-limited welfare world, there was a critical need to convince clients that welfare as we and they knew it really had ended and a radically new system with very different rules was now in place. As one staff member put it, "We don't want to punish people, but with two year and five year time limits, we desperately need to get their attention; partial sanctions just don't do the job. We need to help people understand that time limits are real and that they need to get involved with work **now** if they don't want to hit that five year wall."

For these and other reasons, in designing its welfare reform program Maryland took advantage of the discretion afforded by PRWORA to adopt a full family sanction policy as the initial penalty for the first instance of non-compliance with work and child support requirements. As implemented, sanctions are not progressive; Maryland families lose all Temporary Cash Assistance (TCA, formerly AFDC) benefits for non-

compliance with program requirements related to work and child support. As noted, full family sanctions are also used in Maryland for intentional program violations and non-compliance with substance abuse requirements, but because they are used so infrequently, these are not discussed in this paper.

Under current policy, one 30-day conciliation period is mandated prior to imposing a full family sanction for the first instance of failure to comply with work or child support without verifiable good cause. Subsequent sanctions for the same reason do not result in another conciliation period.³

³ See Appendix A for a more detailed description of individual and full family sanction policies and procedures in Maryland.

Methodology

Today we report on an analysis which looks at full family sanctions in Maryland from two equally important perspectives. The first is the macro level. Using universe data on **all** closing cases, we examine overall rates of full family sanctioning for non-compliance with work or child support requirements in Maryland and each of its 24 local jurisdictions during the first 18 months of reform. The second, micro level analysis uses the more detailed information available on **sample** cases from our *Life After Welfare* study to examine demographic characteristics, welfare and employment histories, cash assistance recidivism rates, and post-sanction employment among a random sample of families sanctioned during this same time period. Comparisons to non-sanctioned exiting cases are also provided.

Macro Analysis Methodology & Data Sources

The analysis of statewide and jurisdiction-level full family sanctioning during the period October 1, 1996 through March 30, 1998 is based on universe data about all TCA case closings during this time period. Identification of the universe of exiting cases is accomplished via monthly case closing extract files obtained by the School of Social Work's (SSW) research team from the state's welfare information management system (CARES). The extract file permits us to segregate cases closed because of a full family sanction, to identify if the sanction resulted from non-compliance with child support or

work program rules, and to determine the local jurisdiction (i.e., the local Department of Social Services, DSS) which imposed the sanction.⁴

Cases may have closed and opened more than once during the study period. For study purposes, cases are admitted to the sample only once, regardless of whether they exited more than once during the study period. That is, we count individual cases which closed, not the aggregate number of closings since the latter may include more than one closing by the same case. For this reason, the number of case closings we report may be less than the number reported by DHR.

Micro Analysis Methodology & Data Sources

The case-level data used in today's analysis are taken from the same 5% random sample of monthly exiting cases that is used in our *Life After Welfare* tracking study and reports.⁵ In general, data gathered for the *Life After Welfare* study and for this analysis of that study's sanctioned cohort of sample cases are obtained from three administrative data systems. The first two are CIS/CARES and AIMS/AMF which contain data about client characteristics and client utilization of public assistance and social service programs under the purview of DHR. The third is the Maryland Automated Benefits System (MABS), which contains employment and wage data on

⁴ Maryland's welfare program is state supervised by the Department of Human Resources (DHR) and locally administered through the Departments of Social Services of which there are 24, one in each of Maryland's 23 counties and in the separate incorporated City of Baltimore.

⁵See Welfare and Child Support Research and Training Group (March 1998). *Life After Welfare: Second Interim Report*. Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Social Work for a more detailed description of the study's design and methodology.

the approximately 93 percent of Maryland jobs which are covered by the state s Unemployment Insurance Program.

The *Life After Welfare* sample from which sanctioned cases have been identified for purposes of today s micro-level analysis, consists of more than three thousand (n=3,171) randomly chosen cases which left cash assistance during the first 18 months of reform. Baseline (at the time of exit) demographic and employment data have been collected and analyzed for the entire *Life After Welfare* sample. Follow-up data are collected, as they become available, on each case and every individual in each case at 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months post-exit.⁶

⁶ Additional data collection at 36, 48 and 60 months post-exit is also planned.

Findings: Full Family Sanctions at the State and Local Levels

At the program management and policy oversight levels, the overarching question of interest with regard to full family sanctions is the extent to which they have been used since their first-ever adoption in Maryland in October 1996. In operational terms, the main question can be stated as: what proportion of unique case closings during the first 18 months of reform have happened as a result of the agency's imposition of a full family sanction? Three secondary, but important issues also need to be examined: (1) intra-state variations in the use of the full family sanction; (2) the breakdown between sanctions imposed for non-compliance with work requirements and those imposed for non-cooperation with child support; and (3) patterns in the use of sanctioning over time. Using universe data, this chapter presents findings on each of these questions in turn.

How Many Cases Have Been Sanctioned Statewide?

In the first 18 months of welfare reform (October 1996 through March 1998) a total of 56,411 unique TCA case closings were recorded in Maryland.⁷ For this universe, the administrative reason for case closure could be determined in 98.1% of cases (55,348/56,411). Where the reason was identifiable, administrative data reveal that seven percent (7.0% or 3,864/55,348) of all closures occurred because a full family

⁷ Cases may have closed and opened more than once during the study period. For study purposes, cases are admitted to the database only once, regardless of whether they exited more than once during the study period. We count individual cases which closed, not the aggregate number of closings which may include more than one closing by the same case. For this reason, the number of case closings we report may be less than the number reported by DHR.

sanction was imposed. These 18 month data are consistent with, though slightly higher than the trend observed in the first 12 months of reform. During that period, full family sanctions accounted for 6.2% (n=2,483/40,183) of all case closures which took place.⁸

Table 1.
Administrative Case Closing Reasons Statewide.

Case Closing Reason	Percentage	Frequency
Work or Child Support Sanction	7.0%	3,864
Other Case Closing Reason	93.0%	51,484
Total	100.0%	55,348

Are There Intra-State Variations in the Use of the Full Family Sanction?⁹

Maryland is a small state in terms of geographic size, but the tremendous diversity contained within its borders has earned it the nickname America in Miniature. Largely because of this diversity, one hallmark principle of the state's new welfare system is that of local flexibility, whereby, operating within federal rules and broad state policy parameters, each jurisdiction, through its local Department of Social Services (DSS) is empowered to craft a welfare program best-suited to the needs of the local community, economy and client population. In such a system, particularly when TCA caseload size and composition are known to differ across the state, variability in full family sanctioning patterns across jurisdictions is expected. In fact, this is what we

⁸ Welfare and Child Support Research and Training Group. (April 1998). *Caseload Exits at the Local Level: The First Year of FIP*. Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Social Work.

⁹ To assist readers who are not familiar with the geography of Maryland, a map of the state is included as Appendix B.

found when the universe of case closings during reform's first 18 months was examined separately for each local subdivision. Table 2 following, presents this information. In brief, the table shows that, across the 24 Local Departments of Social Services, the proportion of case closings due to sanctioning varied from a low of 2.6% in Baltimore City to a high of 21.1% in Somerset, a rural county on Maryland's Eastern Shore. In addition to the City, two other Local Departments of Social Services had fewer than 5% of all closures occurring as a result of sanctioning (Montgomery, 3.6%, and Wicomico, 4.1%). At the other extreme, there are two Local Departments of Social Services in addition to Somerset where 15% or more of all case closings are due to sanctioning: Calvert (18.9%) and Charles Counties (17.1%), both in Southern Maryland.

Table 2.
How Many Cases were Closed Due to Sanctions in Each Jurisdiction?

Jurisdiction	Closings Due to Sanctions		Closings Not Due to Sanctions		Total Closings	
Maryland	7.0%	(3,864)	93.0%	(51,483)	100.0%	(55,347)
Allegany	11.6%	(92)	88.4%	(701)	100.0%	(793)
Anne Arundel	5.7%	(166)	94.3%	(2,732)	100.0%	(2,898)
Baltimore County	14.4%	(934)	85.6%	(5,568)	100.0%	(6,502)
Calvert	18.9%	(95)	81.1%	(407)	100.0%	(502)
Caroline	8.9%	(32)	91.1%	(326)	100.0%	(358)
Carroll	10.6%	(64)	89.4%	(537)	100.0%	(601)
Cecil	12.9%	(106)	87.1%	(713)	100.0%	(819)
Charles	17.1%	(188)	82.9%	(914)	100.0%	(1,102)
Dorchester	10.9%	(63)	89.1%	(515)	100.0%	(578)
Frederick	7.8%	(74)	92.2%	(879)	100.0%	(953)
Garrett	10.9%	(29)	89.1%	(238)	100.0%	(267)
Harford	8.8%	(115)	91.2%	(1,192)	100.0%	(1,307)
Howard	14.7%	(138)	85.3%	(798)	100.0%	(936)
Kent	9.7%	(15)	90.3%	(139)	100.0%	(154)
Montgomery	3.6%	(122)	96.4%	(3,272)	100.0%	(3,394)
Prince George s	6.5%	(652)	93.5%	(9,360)	100.0%	(10,012)
Queen Anne s	11.2%	(24)	88.8%	(191)	100.0%	(215)
St. Mary s	10.8%	(80)	82.9%	(663)	100.0%	(743)
Somerset	21.1%	(96)	78.9%	(358)	100.0%	(454)
Talbot	5.2%	(12)	94.8%	(220)	100.0%	(232)
Washington	12.0%	(146)	88.0%	(1,073)	100.0%	(1,219)
Wicomico	4.1%	(57)	95.9%	(1,320)	100.0%	(1,377)
Worcester	11.5%	(49)	88.5%	(377)	100.0%	(426)
Baltimore City	2.6%	(515)	97.4%	(18,990)	100.0%	(19,505)

Note: Valid percent is used. Due to missing or unavailable data, n may not always equal 55,348.

Are There Differences in the Use of Work vs. Child Support Sanctions?

Thus far we have discussed the use of full family sanctions without differentiating between sanctions for non-compliance with work and those applied for non-cooperation with child support. Partial sanctioning (i.e., partial welfare grant reduction) for both types of non-compliance had been practiced under AFDC, but it was simply not known which type of full family sanction, if either, would commonly occur under the new state-level reformed welfare program. Early Maryland data suggest that full family sanctioning was relatively uncommon in the first months of reform, but also that almost all such sanctions were related to work, not child support. Specifically, data from the first full year of reform in Maryland (October 1996 through September 1997) indicated that while sanctions, overall, represented a small proportion of all 41,212 closures statewide, (6.2%, $n=2,843/40,183$)¹⁰, the breakdown between work sanctions and child support sanctions was extremely skewed. Work sanctions accounted for fully 89.65% of all full family sanctions imposed in the first year and 5.5% of all case closures ($n=2,226/40,183$). In contrast, across the state, only 257 cases (0.64% of all case closures, 10.35% of all sanctioned closures) were sanctioned in the first 12 months for failure to cooperate with child support.

Universe data from the first 18 months of reform (October 1996 through March 1998) continue the trends observed in the first 12 months. Of the 3,864 cases sanctioned in the first 18 months of FIP implementation, 89.39% ($n=3,454/3,864$) were for noncompliance with work and 10.61% ($n=410/3,864$) were for non-cooperation with child support requirements. Table 3 following, presents these data.

¹⁰ Case closing reason could not be determined for 2.5% of cases ($n = 1,029$)

Table 3.
Proportion of Work and Child Support Sanctions: October 1996 - March 1998.

Case Closing Reason	Percent of Case Closings Statewide
Work Sanctions	89.4% (3,454)
Child Support Sanctions	10.6% (410)
Total	100.0% (3,864)

Because local flexibility is a hallmark of Maryland's reformed welfare system, it is also important to examine if and how the relative use of the new, more severe work and child support sanctioning penalties may vary across local jurisdictions. As illustrated in Table 4, following, there are both similarities and differences at the sub-state level. In all 24 jurisdictions, work sanctions have been far more common than child support sanctions in the first 18 months. In three counties (Allegany, Frederick, and Garrett), in fact, all sanctions imposed were work related.

At the same time, Table 4 does reveal considerable variation across counties in the relative frequency of use of the two types of full family sanction. Excluding the three counties where no child support sanctions were imposed, there were nine LDSSes (Anne Arundel, Baltimore County, Caroline, Cecil, Somerset, Talbot, Washington, and Worcester Counties and Baltimore City) where fewer than one in one ten sanctions in the 18 month period were for non-cooperation with child support. At the other extreme, there were two LDSSes (Montgomery and Wicomico Counties) where child support sanctions accounted for more than one of every three full family sanctions imposed. The proportions of sanctions that were child support related in those two jurisdictions were 49.2% (60/122) and 36.8% (21/57) respectively.

Table 4.
Proportion of Work and Child Support Sanctions in Individual Jurisdictions:
October 1996 - March 1998.

Jurisdiction	Full Family Sanctions					
	Work		Child Support		Total	
Maryland	89.4%	(3,454)	10.6%	(410)	100.0%	(3,864)
Allegany	100.0%	(92)	0.0%	(0)	100.0%	(92)
Anne Arundel	93.4%	(155)	6.6%	(11)	100.0%	(166)
Baltimore County	93.3%	(871)	6.7%	(63)	100.0%	(934)
Calvert	89.5%	(85)	10.5%	(10)	100.0%	(95)
Caroline	96.9%	(31)	3.1%	(1)	100.0%	(32)
Carroll	76.6%	(49)	23.4%	(15)	100.0%	(64)
Cecil	91.5%	(97)	8.5%	(9)	100.0%	(106)
Charles	89.9%	(169)	10.1%	(19)	100.0%	(188)
Dorchester	87.3%	(55)	12.7%	(8)	100.0%	(63)
Frederick	100.0%	(74)	0.0%	(0)	100.0%	(74)
Garrett	100.0%	(29)	0.0%	(0)	100.0%	(29)
Harford	83.5%	(96)	16.5%	(19)	100.0%	(115)
Howard	86.2%	(119)	13.8%	(19)	100.0%	(138)
Kent	86.7%	(13)	13.3%	(2)	100.0%	(15)
Montgomery	50.8%	(62)	49.2%	(60)	100.0%	(122)
Prince George s	88.5%	(577)	11.5%	(75)	100.0%	(652)
Queen Anne s	79.2%	(19)	20.8%	(5)	100.0%	(24)
St. Mary s	80.0%	(64)	20.0%	(16)	100.0%	(80)
Somerset	99.0%	(95)	1.0%	(1)	100.0%	(96)
Talbot	91.7%	(11)	8.3%	(1)	100.0%	(12)
Washington	91.8%	(134)	8.2%	(12)	100.0%	(146)
Wicomico	63.2%	(36)	36.8%	(21)	100.0%	(57)
Worcester	93.9%	(46)	6.1%	(3)	100.0%	(49)
Baltimore City	92.2%	(475)	7.8%	(40)	100.0%	(515)

Has the Rate of Sanctioning Changed over Time?

We also examined whether, for the state as a whole, the use of sanctions increased, decreased, or remained the same across the 18 month study period. Specifically, we wanted to determine whether sanctioning was more or less common among cases which exited in the first few months of reform than among those whose cases closed later. To examine this question we divided the data into three cohorts: TCA cases which closed in the first six months of reform; those where the exit took place in the 7th through 12th months of reform; and those who left TCA in the 13th through 18th months of the new program. The results of our cohort analysis appear in the next table.

Table 5.
Statewide Cohort Effects: Sanctions

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=21,189)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=20,015)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=15,207)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=56,411)
Closing Code Available	20,746	19,429	15,173	55,348
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	95.9% (19,901)	91.6% (17,791)	90.9% (13,792)	93.0% (51,484)
Sanctioned	4.1% (845)	8.4% (1,638)	9.1% (1,381)	7.0% (3,864)
Type of Sanction				
Work	3.7% (763)	7.5% (1,463)	8.1% (1,228)	6.2% (3,454)
Child Support	0.4% (82)	0.9% (175)	1.0% (153)	0.7% (410)

Note: Closing code is missing for 1.9% (1,063/56,411) of cases in the universe file. * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

A significant relationship was found between exiting cohort and sanctions. Specifically, the percentage of cases sanctioned for work or child support reasons was 4.1% in the first 6 months of reform, October 1996 to March 1997, but more than

doubled between April and September 1997, rising to 8.4%. Between October 1997 and March 1998, the percentage of sanctioned cases increased slightly to 9.1%.

In terms of the type of sanction imposed, the use of both work and child support sanctions increased over time. However, the relative use of each type of sanction remained consistent. That is, across all cohorts the vast majority of sanctions were imposed for noncompliance with work requirements.

Are There Cohort Effects in Individual Jurisdictions?¹¹

Consistent with the statewide pattern, we find a significant relationship between exiting cohort and the rate of sanctioning in the large majority of local jurisdictions (n = 18 of 24). In six counties (Garrett, Harford, Howard, Kent, Queen Anne s and Washington), there was no significant change over time in the use of sanctions.

Among the 18 jurisdictions evidencing a significant relationship between exiting cohort and the rate of sanctioning, four different patterns are found. First, the proportion of cases closing because of a full family sanction increased steadily over the three six month time periods in four (Allegany, Baltimore, Caroline, and Dorchester Counties) of the 18 jurisdictions demonstrating a statistically significant relationship. Second, in ten jurisdictions (Anne Arundel, Calvert, Carroll, Cecil, Frederick, Prince George s, Somerset, Talbot and Wicomico Counties, as well as Baltimore City), the proportion of sanctioned cases increased from the first to second six month study period, but remained steady from the second to third period. Third, the rate of sanctioning increased from the first to second study period and then decreased from

¹¹ See Appendix C for detailed tabular information about rates of sanctioning and the breakdown between work and child support sanctions across the three cohorts in each of the state s 24 local jurisdictions.

the second to third period in Charles and St. Mary s Counties. Finally, Montgomery and Worcester Counties showed a steady rate of sanctioning during the first twelve months of FIP implementation and an increase in sanctioning over the last six month period examined.

For those jurisdictions with a sufficient number of both child support and work sanctions to permit statistical analyses (n = 4; Baltimore, Montgomery, and Prince George s Counties, and Baltimore City), we also examined whether the relative use of each type of sanction changed over time. We found no significant relationship for Baltimore and Prince George s Counties.

In Montgomery County, the rate of child support sanctions increased dramatically from 44.4% of all sanctions in the first six month period (October 1996 to March 1997) to 85.7% of all sanctions in the second six month period (April 1997 to September 1997), but falling to 35.8% in the last six months (October 1997 to March 1998). Consequently, the proportion of sanctions in Montgomery County due to non-cooperation with work requirements fell drastically from 55.6% of all sanctions in the first six month period to 14.3% of all sanctions in the second six month period and then increased in the third six month period.

Baltimore City exhibited a different pattern, with a steady rate of child support sanctions in the first twelve months (4.8% and 4.1% in the first two six month periods, respectively) followed by a sharp increase to 11.9% during the last six months. The proportion of work sanctions in Baltimore City consequently stayed steady for the first two six month periods (95.2% and 95.9% in the first and second six month periods respectively) and then decreased sharply to 87.1% in the third six month period.

Findings: Baseline Characteristics of Sanctioned Cases

The previous chapter uses administrative data from DHR's statewide information management system on the entire universe of sanctioned cases to present state and local program-level findings about the use of full family sanctions during the first 18 months of welfare reform. This type of information is of unquestioned importance to elected and appointed officials charged with monitoring the overall operation of the new welfare system in our state and to advocates. However, this macro-level data does not tell program managers and other interested parties all that they need to know to assess program operations and the effects of these new policies on families. In particular, not addressed in the aggregate data are two questions of prime importance: what are the characteristics of sanctioned families? and, what do we know about those families after their TCA cases have been closed? The next two chapters address these questions using data from the previously described *Life After Welfare* sample. This chapter addresses the first question, comparing sanctioned families to non-sanctioned families at baseline, or the time of exit from cash assistance. The next chapter presents follow up data on employment and recidivism.

Sample Sizes

Of the 3,171 families included in our *Life After Welfare* 18 month sample for whom the reason for case closure could be determined (n=3,149 or 99.31%), fewer than one in ten (251/3,149) or eight percent had their TCA cases closed due to the welfare agency's imposition of a full family sanction. The vast majority of these sanctions were for failure to comply with work requirements (n=229; 7.3% of all exits,

and 91.2% of all sanctions). Fewer than one percent (n=22; 0.7% of all exits, and 8.8% of all sanctions) of cases were closed because of non-cooperation with child support requirements.

Table 6.
Rate of Sanctioning in the 18 Month Sample

Case Closing Reason	Percent of Case Closings Statewide
Work Sanctions	7.3% (229)
Child Support Sanctions	0.7% (22)
All other Case Closing Reasons	92.0% (2,898)
Total	100.0% (3,149)

Demographic Characteristics

Analyses of the demographic characteristics of the entire exiting sample (not just sanctioned cases) reveal that the average exiting payee is 31.67 years of age, had her first child at the age of 21, is most likely to be African American, and to have two children.¹² Contrasts were performed to determine if the demographic characteristics of sanctioned payees differ from those of non-sanctioned payees (see Table 7 for detailed demographics). Statistically significant differences were found for seven of the nine characteristics examined: 1) payee s age; 2) age at first birth; 3) racial/ethnic background; 4) assistance unit size; 5) number of adults in the assistance unit; 6) pre-exit wage history; and 7) region of residence.

¹² See Welfare and Child Support Research and Training Group (March 1999). *Life After Welfare: Third Interim Report*. Baltimore: University of Maryland School of Social Work for a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of those who left welfare during the first 18 months of welfare reform.

In brief, sanctioned payees are younger, began childbearing at an earlier age, have larger assistance units, are less likely to have previously worked in UI-covered employment in Maryland and are more likely to be Caucasian. Sanctioned and non-sanctioned cases also differ in terms of region of residence and number of adults included in the assistance unit. More detailed information on each of these characteristics follows.

Payee s Age

The heads of sanctioned cases are younger, on average, than those exiting welfare for all other reasons. Although this difference is small -- less than two years-- it is statistically significant. On average, sanctioned payees are 30.16 years old, and half are younger than 29.42 years of age; non-sanctioned payees on average are 31.80 years of age, and half are younger than 30.36 years.

Payee s Age at First Birth

The heads of sanctioned cases began childbearing at a significantly younger age than those who left welfare for reasons other than sanctions.¹³ The average age of a sanctioned payee at first birth was 21.04 years, with a midpoint of 19.78 years. In contrast, the average age of a non-sanctioned payee at first birth was 21.90 years, with a midpoint of 20.51 years.

The distributions of ages at first birth for both groups were similar, with one quarter (26.4%) of sanctioned case-heads and one fifth (21.4%) of non-sanctioned

¹³ Estimates of age at first birth for female payees were calculated using the payee s date of birth and the date of birth of her oldest child included in the assistance unit. Our calculation may overestimate the age at first birth if the payee has another, older child who is not included in the assistance unit.

case-heads having a child before the age of 18. Slightly more in both groups had their first children between the ages of 18 and 20 -- 26.8% and 23.5% for sanctioned and non-sanctioned payees, respectively. About one in three sanctioned (31.1%) and non-sanctioned (34.3%) case heads began childbearing between the ages of 21 and 25. The remainder, 15.8% of sanctioned case-heads and 20.8% of non-sanctioned case-heads, had their first child at age 26 or older.

Racial/Ethnic Background

A significant relationship was found between racial/ethnic group and sanctioned status. A larger proportion of Caucasian payees were sanctioned than was expected given their overall proportion in the exiting sample. Specifically, Caucasian payees make up 29.2% of the exiting sample, but 39.0% of the sanctioned sample. A smaller proportion of African American families were sanctioned than was expected. Though African American families make up 68.2% of the exiting sample, only 58.1% of sanctioned families were African American.¹⁴

Assistance Unit Size and Composition

The average sanctioned family was larger than the average non-sanctioned exiting family (2.82 and 2.66 persons per assistance unit respectively). However, the median number of persons per assistance unit was the same across both groups: two persons.

¹⁴ This finding most likely arises from the fact that the rate of sanctioning in Baltimore City (2.6%) and Prince George's County (6.5%), subdivisions with very large non-Caucasian populations and the state's largest TCA caseloads, were lower than the statewide sanctioning rate (7.0%) for this 18 month period.

Sanctioned and non-sanctioned families did not differ in the number of children per assistance unit, in the age of the assistance unit's youngest child, nor in the proportion of cases with children who were under 3 years of age. They did differ, however in the number of adults per assistance unit. Nine out of ten (91.2%) sanctioned cases included an adult as compared to eight of ten (83.0%) non-sanctioned cases.¹⁵

Pre-Exit Wage History

Pre-exit wage history refers to employment in UI-covered jobs in Maryland in quarters prior to the quarter of exit from TCA. Approximately 93% of Maryland jobs are covered by the state's Unemployment Insurance (UI) system. Important omissions for our purposes include military and civilian federal employees, and, of course, those who are employed in the four states and the District of Columbia which border Maryland.

Review of the within-Maryland UI data reveals that significantly fewer sanctioned than non-sanctioned adults had pre-exit wage histories although, in both groups, the majority of all payees had some prior history of employment in a UI-covered job. Almost seven in ten non-sanctioned adults had pre-exit wage histories (68.5%), compared to nearly six in ten (59.0%) sanctioned adults.

¹⁵ At first glance, readers may wonder why 100% of sanctioned cases do not contain at least one adult (i.e. Why would a child-only case be sanctioned?) The reason is that the adult custodians associated with child-only cases are required to cooperate with child support on behalf of the youngsters for whom cash assistance is received; failure to do so is the only grounds for sanctioning in these cases.

Region

The distribution of sanctioned cases across the regions of Maryland was significantly different from what might have been expected. Perhaps the most surprising finding was in Baltimore City, where far fewer cases were sanctioned than expected based on the City's proportion of the total closed cases. Specifically, Baltimore City accounted for only 7.2% of all sanctioned cases, though it accounted for just about one third (31.6%) of all closed cases. The reverse was true in Baltimore County, and in the Western, Southern, and Eastern Shore regions: more cases were sanctioned in these areas than would have been expected based on the proportion of all closing cases represented in these regions. In all other areas of the state, the number of sanctioned cases was about what was expected given the number of closed cases in those regions. Regional data also appear in Table 7, following.

Table 7.
Comparisons between Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned Cases: Case Characteristics.

Characteristics	Non-Sanctioned	Sanctioned	Total
Payee s Age**			
18-20	4.6% (126)	5.6% (14)	4.7% (140)
21-25	21.7% (599)	24.2% (60)	21.9% (659)
26-30	22.2% (614)	23.0% (57)	22.3% (671)
31-35	20.7% (570)	22.6% (56)	20.8% (626)
36 and older	30.9% (852)	24.6% (61)	30.3% (913)
Mean	31.80	30.16	31.67
Median	30.36	29.42	30.26
Std. Dev.	9.36	7.62	9.24
Range	18 to 86	18 to 61	18 to 86
Payee s Age at First Birth*			
Under 18			
18-20	21.4% (510)	26.4% (62)	21.9% (572)
21-25	23.5% (559)	26.8% (63)	23.8% (622)
26-30	34.3% (815)	31.1% (73)	34.0% (888)
31-35	12.0% (286)	9.4% (22)	11.8% (308)
36 and older	5.6% (132)	3.8% (9)	5.4% (141)
	3.2% (77)	2.6% (6)	3.2% (83)
Mean			
Median	21.90	21.04	21.82
Std. Dev.	20.51	19.78	20.42
Range	5.24	4.92	5.22
	13 to 49	13 to 43	13 to 49
Payee s Racial/Ethnic Background***			
Caucasian	28.4% (765)	39.0% (92)	29.2% (857)
African-American	69.1% (1,864)	58.1% (137)	68.2% (2,001)
Other	2.4% (67)	2.9% (7)	2.5% (74)
Assistance Unit Size*			
1	10.4% (300)	4.8% (12)	9.9% (312)
2	42.8% (1,240)	46.6% (117)	43.1% (1,357)
3	26.8% (777)	24.3% (61)	26.6% (838)
4 or more	20.0% (581)	24.3% (61)	20.4% (642)
Mean	2.66	2.82	2.67
Median	2.00	2.00	2.00
Std. Dev.	1.14	1.23	1.15
Range	1 to 9	1 to 11	1 to 11

Characteristics	Non-Sanctioned	Sanctioned	Total
Number of Adults***			
0	14.3% (414)	5.6% (14)	13.6% (428)
1	83.0% (2,406)	91.2% (229)	83.7% (2,635)
2	2.7% (78)	3.2% (8)	2.7% (86)
Mean	0.88	0.98	0.89
Median	1.00	1.00	1.00
Std. Dev.	0.40	0.30	0.39
Range	0 to 2	0 to 2	0 to 2
Number of Children			
0	2.4% (70)	2.0% (5)	2.4% (75)
1	47.3% (1,371)	47.8% (120)	47.3% (1,491)
2	30.1% (872)	27.1% (68)	29.9% (940)
3 or more	20.2% (585)	23.1% (58)	20.4% (643)
Mean	1.78	1.84	1.78
Median	2.00	2.00	2.00
Std. Dev.	1.04	1.16	1.05
Range	0 to 8	0 to 9	0 to 9
Age of Youngest Child			
under age 1	11.0% (302)	5.3% (13)	10.5% (315)
ages 1 - 2	24.1% (661)	29.0% (71)	24.5% (732)
ages 3 - 4	19.5% (534)	22.0% (54)	19.7% (588)
ages 5 - 9	27.7% (759)	26.5% (65)	27.6% (824)
ages 10 - 12	8.9% (244)	9.0% (22)	8.9% (266)
ages 13 - 15	6.2% (171)	4.5% (11)	6.1% (182)
ages 16 - 18	2.7% (74)	3.7% (9)	2.8% (83)
Mean	5.63	5.69	5.63
Median	4.39	4.39	4.38
Std. Dev.	4.39	4.39	4.38
Range	<1 to 17.98	<1 to 17.78	<1 to 17.98
Percent less than 3 years	35.1%	34.3%	35.0%
Pre-Exit Wage History?***	68.5% (1,986)	59.0% (148)	67.8% (2,134)
Region***			
Baltimore City	33.7% (976)	7.2% (18)	31.6% (994)
Prince George s County	19.0% (549)	19.5% (49)	19.0% (598)
Montgomery County	5.6% (162)	4.8% (12)	5.5% (174)
Baltimore County	12.2% (352)	25.1% (63)	13.2% (415)
Anne Arundel County	6.2% (181)	6.0% (15)	6.2% (196)
Metro	5.7% (164)	6.8% (17)	5.7% (181)
Western Maryland	5.3% (153)	10.8% (27)	5.7% (180)
Eastern Shore	9.0% (260)	11.2% (28)	9.1% (288)
Southern Maryland	3.5% (100)	8.8% (22)	3.9% (122)

Notes: Valid percent is used. Due to missing or unavailable data, n may not always sum to 3,149. An independent samples t-test was used to determine whether there were differences in means between sanctioned and non-sanctioned cases. The Chi-square statistic was used to test categorical data about racial/ethnic group.

* p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Cash Assistance History

Exit Spell Length

The length of the TCA spell culminating in case closure for the October 1996 through March 1998 exiting cohorts (including both sanctioned and non-sanctioned cases) ranged from 1 month to 23.83 years.¹⁶ For the entire sample, the average exit spell length was 25.36 months or just over two years, and the median was 13.93 months, with a standard deviation of 31.48 months.

Sanctioned cases were compared with non-sanctioned cases to determine whether there were significant differences in exit spell length between the two groups. There were. The average sanctioned case had a significantly shorter exit spell (19.90 months) than did the average non-sanctioned case (25.94 months). The distributions of exit spell lengths of the two groups differed as well. About half (51.4%) of all sanctioned cases had an exit spell shorter than 12 months, in contrast to about two-fifths (42.7%) of non-sanctioned cases. Detailed data on exiting spells are presented on the next page.

¹⁶ The data for this case, which at first glance may appear to be a mistake, were checked and appear to be accurate.

Table 8. Comparisons between Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned Cases: Cash Assistance History - Exit Spell Length.

Characteristics	Non-Sanctioned	Sanctioned	Total
Exit Spell			
Less than 12 mos.	42.7% (1,236)	51.4% (129)	43.3% (1,365)
12 - 24 Months	24.9% (721)	20.7% (52)	24.5% (773)
25 - 36 Months	11.8% (342)	9.6% (24)	11.6% (366)
37 - 48 Months	5.8% (167)	10.8% (27)	6.2% (194)
49 - 60 Months	4.2% (123)	2.4% (6)	4.1% (129)
More than 60 mos.	10.7% (309)	5.2% (13)	10.2% (322)
Mean***	25.94	19.90	25.46
Median	14.13	11.27	13.97
Std. Dev.	32.10	23.63	31.55
Range	1 month to 23.83 years	1 month to 12.43 years	1 month to 23.83 years

Lifetime Cash Assistance History

Lifetime (as an adult) cash assistance histories are also available. Sanctioned families do not differ from non-sanctioned families in terms of lifetime history of cash assistance receipt. Both groups have an average lifetime history of about 4 years. A bit more than one in five families in each group had lifetime histories of less than 12 months, 17% had lifetime histories between 12 and 24 months, 12% between 25 and 36 months, and one in ten have lifetime histories between 37 and 48 months long. About 7% had histories which were between 49 and 60 months long, and almost three in ten had lifetime histories that were longer than 60 months. These data appear in Table 9, on the next page.

Table 9.
Comparisons between Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned Cases: Lifetime Cash Assistance History.

Characteristics	Non-Sanctioned	Sanctioned	Total
Total Time Spent on Welfare			
Less than 12 mos.	23.7% (687)	22.7% (57)	23.6% (744)
12 - 24 Months	17.4% (503)	15.5% (39)	17.2% (542)
25 - 36 Months	12.3% (355)	11.2% (28)	12.2% (383)
37 - 48 Months	10.0% (290)	12.4% (31)	10.2% (321)
49 - 60 Months	7.4% (215)	7.2% (18)	7.4% (233)
More than 60 mos.	29.2% (846)	31.1% (78)	29.4% (924)
Mean	47.03	48.36	47.14
Median	33.49	37.04	33.98
Std. Dev.	44.28	42.13	44.11
Range	1 month to 26.84 years	1 month to 15.07 years	1 month to 26.84 years

Findings: Returns to TCA and Employment

The previous chapter describes the characteristics of sanctioned cases and compares them to non-sanctioned cases at the time of exit from the cash assistance rolls. This chapter addresses two other important questions concerning what happens to sanctioned families after their cash assistance cases close. Specifically, the chapter provides preliminary answers to the following questions: (1) Do sanctioned families return to cash assistance? and (2) Do payees in sanctioned cases find employment in UI-covered jobs in Maryland after they leave the welfare rolls?

Recidivism: Do They Come Back to TCA?

The issue of recidivism, or returns to the welfare rolls, is an important phenomenon to track in the new time-limited welfare world, since every month on (or off) welfare is important vis-a-vis the 60 month ceiling on an adult's receipt of benefits. In the authors' opinion, recidivism among sanctioned welfare leavers should be of particular research and programmatic concern. Sanctioned families since they leave welfare involuntarily may be hypothesized to be at considerably greater risk of recidivism than families whose cases close for other reasons. Moreover, since curing a sanction by complying with a work or child support requirement does make the family eligible to return to assistance, sanctioned families might be expected to return to welfare more quickly as well as more often than their non-sanctioned counterparts. That is, a first-time work sanction, as well as any child support sanction, can be cured immediately upon compliance thus restoring eligibility, and minimizing the length of time that a family spends off the welfare rolls.

To examine these issues, recidivism rates were calculated for both sanctioned and non-sanctioned exiting cases using two different approaches. Data are available for 2,665 cases at the three month post-exit follow up point, for 2,156 cases at six months after case closure, and for 1,054 families at the 12 month follow up point.¹⁷

Recidivism at Three Months

A. Worst Case Analysis

For all 2,665 cases considered together, at the three month post-exit follow up point, a "worst case" analysis shows that one in five exiting families had returned to the rolls. These are worst case statistics largely because they do not take into account the phenomenon of administrative churning, where cases close, but reopen within 30 days or less. Excluding churning cases from the analysis reduces the three month recidivism rate to about 5%.

As expected, sanctioned families did return to welfare at a higher rate than non-sanctioned families. More than one of every three sanctioned families (35.2%) returned within three months, while fewer than two in ten non-sanctioned families (18.4%) returned in the same period of time. Sanctioned families also returned to welfare more quickly than non-sanctioned families. Nearly one in four sanctioned families (24.1%), to illustrate, returned to welfare within 30 days of exit compared to only 13.7% of non-sanctioned families. A larger proportion of sanctioned than non-sanctioned (11.1% and 4.7% respectively) families also returned in the period after 30 days but within 3 months of their exit. The difference in returns to welfare between sanctioned and non-

¹⁷ Because of the nature of our data collection cycle (follow up at 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months post-exit), we have differing amounts of follow up recidivism data for our monthly samples of cases.

sanctioned families at the 3 month follow up point is statistically significant, as shown in Table 10 on page 37.

B. USDHHS Analysis

Many studies which began to examine TANF recidivism after our first Maryland analyses of returns to welfare were published use a more restrictive or less inclusive definition of a welfare leaver or a welfare exit than we do. Specifically, many other studies, including those funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS), define a leaver/exit as a case which leaves TANF and remains off TANF for at least 60 days (i.e., two months). In the studies which use this definition, cases which close, but reopen in 60 days or less are not included. Our study, in contrast, defines a leaver or an exit more broadly; cases are eligible for inclusion in our research sample so long as they do not close and reopen on the same day.

This case selection or definitional difference has very important ramifications insofar as recidivism analyses, especially comparative ones, are concerned. In particular, Maryland recidivism rates may look higher than other studies rates because our data include cases which return to welfare in 60 days or less whereas other studies exclude them.

We continue to believe that our more inclusive approach is the more appropriate and informative, but also recognize the importance of being able to make meaningful comparisons across states. Thus, for this and all subsequent recidivism discussions, we run our data a second time using the more restrictive USDHHS definition of a welfare leaver/exit (i.e., we exclude all sample cases which left welfare, but returned to the rolls in 60 days or less).

As shown in Table 11, on page 37, this alternative approach does have an appreciable, lowering effect on recidivism rates for the entire sample as well as for sanctioned and non-sanctioned families separately examined. For all cases at the 3 months post-exit point, the recidivism rate drops to 2.8 percent. Among non-sanctioned cases, we find that only 2.6% have returned to welfare 90 days after their departure. Among sanctioned cases the rate is also much lower (5.8%), although double the rate for non-sanctioned families. The difference between sanctioned and non-sanctioned cases is statistically significant, shown in Table 11 on page 37.

Recidivism at Six Months

A. Worst Case Analysis

Including all 2,156 cases (i.e. the worst case approach), one in four families (23.2%) had returned to cash assistance at the end of six months.¹⁸ At this measuring point, too, sanctioned families' recidivism rates are much higher than the rate among non-sanctioned families. Almost four in ten sanctioned families (38.3%) had returned after 6 months compared to about two in ten non-sanctioned families (22.0%). The difference in returns to welfare between sanctioned and non-sanctioned families at the 6 month follow up point is statistically significant, as shown in Table 10 on page 37.

B. USDHHS Analysis

At the six months post-exit point, using the more restrictive approach to defining a welfare leaver/exit yields results similar to those observed three months post-exit. That is, the overall sample s recidivism rate is reduced to 8.9% (compared to 23.2%

¹⁸ This statistic, once again does include churners and thus, compared to other states studies, overstates Maryland's true recidivism rate.

using the worst case method). Rates for sanctioned (11.8%) and non-sanctioned (8.7%) cases are also considerably reduced. Using the USDHHS definition, however, we find no significant difference in 6 month recidivism rates between the two groups.

Recidivism at Twelve Months

A. Worst Case Analysis

At the twelve month follow up point, one in four families in our entire sample (n=1,054) had returned to cash assistance.¹⁹ However, at the one year post-exit point, no significant difference was found in the recidivism rate between sanctioned and non-sanctioned families. About one in four sanctioned and non-sanctioned families had returned to welfare within 12 months of their exit.

B. USDHHS Analysis

Using the alternative definition to calculate returns to welfare at the one year post-exit mark results in a cumulative recidivism rate for the entire sample of 16.7%. This compares to a 23.6% cumulative rate using the worst case method. No statistically significant differences are found between sanctioned (13.9%) and non-sanctioned (16.8%) cases in their 12 month recidivism rates. Somewhat surprisingly, the cumulative recidivism rate is a bit higher among non-sanctioned families than among sanctioned families.

However, this finding should be treated with extreme caution since the total number of sanctioned cases is so small (due to the exclusion of cases returning in 60 days or less) and because the cases comprising the 12 month follow up group are those who were sanctioned during the first six months of FIP implementation.

¹⁹ This statistic, once again does include churners and thus, compared to other states studies, overstates Maryland's true recidivism rate.

Table 10.
Recidivism Rates for Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned Cases: Worst Case.

Recidivism Rate	Non-Sanctioned	Sanctioned	Total
3 mo. follow up group***			
Did not return	81.6% (1,995)	64.8% (129)	80.3% (2,124)
Returned in 30 days or less	13.7% (335)	24.1% (48)	14.5% (383)
Returned bet. 31 days and 3 months	4.7% (116)	11.1% (22)	5.2% (138)
Total returning cases	18.4% (451)	35.2% (70)	19.7% (521)
6 mo. follow up group***			
Did not return	78.0% (1,552)	61.6% (90)	76.9% (1,642)
Returned in 30 days or less	12.5% (248)	21.2% (31)	13.1% (279)
Returned bet. 31 days and 6 months	9.5% (190)	17.1% (25)	10.1% (215)
Total returning cases	22.0% (438)	38.3% (56)	23.2% (494)
12 mo. follow up group			
Did not return	76.3% (764)	77.5% (31)	76.4% (795)
Returned in 30 days or less	6.4% (64)	2.5% (1)	6.2% (65)
Returned bet. 31 days and 12 months	17.3% (173)	20.0% (8)	17.4% (181)
Total returning cases	23.7% (237)	22.5% (9)	23.6% (246)

Note: * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Table 11.
Recidivism Rates for Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned Cases: USDHHS Definition of Recidivism.

Recidivism Rate	Non-Sanctioned	Sanctioned	Total
3 mo. follow up group***			
Did not return	97.4% (1,995)	94.2% (129)	97.2% (2,124)
Returned bet. 61 days and 3 months	2.6% (54)	5.8% (8)	2.8% (62)
6 mo. follow up group			
Did not return	91.3% (1,552)	88.2% (90)	91.1% (1,642)
Returned bet. 61 days and 6 months	8.7% (148)	11.8% (12)	8.9% (160)
12 mo. follow up group			
Did not return	83.2% (764)	86.1% (31)	83.3% (795)
Returned bet. 61 days and 12 months	16.8% (154)	13.9% (5)	16.7% (159)

Note: * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Employment: Are They Working In UI-covered Jobs?

Employment outcomes for all payees in our sample were examined using data available in the Maryland Automated Benefits System (MABS), the state's Unemployment Insurance database. These data represent the roughly 93% of Maryland jobs covered by Unemployment Insurance, but do not include data about federal civilian and military jobs, employment in the four surrounding states, and the District of Columbia which abut Maryland, off the books informal employment, self-employment, and the like. It is also important to bear in mind that these data pertain only to the adult who was, formerly, the head (or payee) of the TCA case. These data do not reflect employment or earnings of any other adults who may reside in the household. With these caveats in mind, Table 12 presents the results of comparisons between sanctioned and non-sanctioned cases with regard to payees' employment and earnings in the quarter of exit from welfare, and in the quarter after exit. Significant differences were found between the sanctioned and non-sanctioned groups on all employment variables examined; on all variables, sanctioned payees fare poorly compared to non-sanctioned payees.

Employment in Quarter of Exit

As shown in Table 12, significantly fewer sanctioned than non-sanctioned caseheads were working in UI-covered jobs in the quarter in which their welfare cases closed. More than half (56.1%) of non-sanctioned payees had UI-covered earnings in the quarter they exited TCA, compared to only about a third (31.1%) of sanctioned caseheads. Average earnings (in UI-covered jobs) for sanctioned and non-sanctioned payees who were working also differed significantly in the quarter of TCA exit. Average

or mean quarterly earnings among non-sanctioned payees were \$2,344.41; among sanctioned payees, the figure was \$1,741.57.²⁰

Table 12.
Comparisons Between Sanctioned and Non-Sanctioned Cases: Employment²¹

Characteristics	Non-Sanctioned	Sanctioned	Total
Working in the Quarter of TCA Exit***	56.1% (1,184)	31.1% (47)	54.4% (1,231)
Earnings in Quarter of TCA Exit			
Mean*	\$2,344.41	\$1,741.57	\$2,321.39
Median	\$2,119.00	\$1,544.78	\$2,103.00
Standard Deviation	\$1,847.77	\$1,831.38	\$1,848.64
Minimum	\$1.00	\$36.00	\$1.00
Maximum	\$18,750.00	\$18,750.00	\$18,750.00
Working in the Quarter After TCA Exit***	55.7% (1,175)	38.4% (58)	54.5% (1,233)
Earnings in Quarter After TCA Exit			
Mean**	\$2,456.60	\$1,648.74	\$2,418.60
Median	\$2,240.00	\$1,337.00	\$2,197.00
Standard Deviation	\$1,803.56	\$1,519.67	\$1,798.83
Minimum	\$10.00	\$27.00	\$10.00
Maximum	\$15,778.00	\$6,717.00	\$15,778.00

Note: * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001

Employment in Quarter After Exit

Patterns were similar in the quarter after welfare case closure, though the proportion of sanctioned payees who were working in UI-covered jobs (38.4%) was higher than in the previous quarter (31.1%). Among non-sanctioned payees the

²⁰ As noted, the MABS system reports earnings on an aggregate quarterly basis. Thus, we do not know when or how long in the quarter someone worked and how many hours they worked and it is impossible to compute hourly wage figures from these quarterly earnings data.

²¹ To present a more accurate picture of post-exit employment, those cases who returned to TCA in 30 days or less (i.e. churners) were excluded from these analyses. Cases for whom recidivism and/or case closing reason data were not available were also excluded, bringing the valid n to 2,262. (3,171-506 cases with no recidivism data = 2,665. 2,665 - 20 cases with unknown case closing reason = 2,645. 2,645 - 383 cases who returned to welfare in 30 days or less = 2,262.)

proportion employed was significantly greater (55.7%); this proportion, however, was about the same as it had been in the previous quarter.

Average earnings for both groups of former recipients remained about the same as in the quarter of welfare case closure. Consistent with the pattern observed in the exit quarter, mean earnings from UI-covered jobs were greater for non-sanctioned adults (\$2,456.60) than for those who had been sanctioned (\$1,648.74); this difference was statistically significant.

What About Payees in the Other Sanctioned Cases?

Of the 199 sanctioned cases (of 251 total sanctioned cases) for whom we have post-exit employment and welfare recidivism data, the preceding discussion shows that three-fifths (n=120, 60.3%) of case heads/former payees either work right after case closure (n=73) or return to cash assistance (n=47). The obvious question of course is what, if anything, do we know about the remaining 79 and, in particular, how many appear to have totally disappeared from view? From examination of CARES data we find that of the 79 case heads/former payees who were not working and not back on TCA, the vast majority (n=68 of 79) were receiving Food Stamps in Maryland.²² Of case heads/former payees who were not working, and not receiving TCA or Food Stamps (n=11), enrollment in Medical Assistance could be confirmed for four (n=4 of 11).

The above preliminary analysis indicates that there are a total of seven former payees about whom the administrative data we examined are silent. However, these

²²These data pertain only to the adult who formerly headed the cash assistance case; for purposes of this analysis, we focused on adults on whom a full family sanction had been imposed, and did not examine Medical Assistance or Food Stamp receipt by children.

families, in particular, are ones in whom we suspect interest is great. Thus, we then reviewed narrative material recorded in the CARES system in an attempt to learn more about what might be happening in these families since their cash assistance cases were closed.²³ For each of the seven cases, the following paragraphs represent short synopses derived from the narrative materials. Names and other identifying information have been eliminated or changed to preserve confidentiality.

Ms. A had been receiving TCA for herself and her four children when she was sanctioned for not cooperating with child support. In the same month the sanction was applied, agency mail was returned indicating that Ms. A had moved out of state.

Ms. B received TCA for herself and her two children. She received a full family sanction for noncompliance with job search requirements. Her children continued to receive Food Stamps and Medical Assistance. In addition, Ms. B lives with a friend who receives SSI and her children both receive Survivor s Benefits.

Mr. C and his sixteen year old son received TCA and were sanctioned for not registering with a work program. During the three months following the sanction, Mr. C received Unemployment Insurance benefits.

Ms. D received TCA for herself and her two sons off and on for three years. Before receiving the sanction that brought her into our sample, she had been sanctioned twice before for not participating in a work program. During the month in which the most recent full family sanction was applied, Ms. D moved out of state.

Mr. Q received TCA for his eight year old granddaughter. His case was sanctioned for non-compliance with child support requirements. The next month the granddaughter s mother returned from another state, the granddaughter returned to her mother s care, and the family began receiving TCA.

Mrs. R was receiving assistance for two minor relatives. She received a full family sanction for non-cooperation with child support enforcement.

²³CARES provides free-form space in which workers are required to record or narrate certain case actions, but where they may also record other information deemed important or pertinent.

The case narrative provides no further information on what happened after the sanction was applied. However, through other data we have been able to determine that the two minor children went to live with another aunt who receives TCA for them.

Ms. S. received TCA for herself and her teenage son. She was sanctioned for not participating in a work activity. Later narratives reveal that Ms. S., her now adult son, her adult daughter, and her three grandchildren reside in a house that Ms. S. owns; none of the adults in the household appear to be working in UI-covered employment in Maryland. At times Ms. S or her daughter apply for TCA and Food Stamps for the minor children, but the situation is never stable enough for the case to be approved. The narrative indicates that Ms. S s mother has contacted the agency stating that she is supporting the minor children.

Our analysis of these 199 sanctioned families post-exit experiences and these seven families case narratives in particular, indicate that life situations after sanctioning are complex and there is no single trajectory or outcome which all sanctioned families follow. Most commonly, as shown, adults either come into compliance with program rules and return to cash assistance or they seek and find employment. From the case narratives, we see that in other instances families move out of state or find/have other means of support such as Unemployment Insurance, Supplemental Security Income or Social Security; in no cases examined in this study did families just disappear . At the same time, however, the case narratives do suggest that some families clearly face difficult, complicated life circumstances which may interfere with their ability to comply with stricter cash assistance program requirements.

Conclusions

This paper has used universe data from the state's information management systems and data on a random sample of families who left welfare under PRWORA-based reforms in Maryland to look at one sub-group of families about whom there has been great concern and speculation, but little empirical information: those whose grants have been terminated for non-compliance with program rules. In electing to adopt this more stringent penalty, the so-called full family sanction, the study state (Maryland) was clear that its intent was not to use sanctioning as a means of reducing the caseload. Rather, the purpose was to get customers' attention - in particular, to secure their participation in work so that the lifetime limit on adults' benefit receipt would not be reached. Central to the state's adoption of a full family sanctioning policy were program data which seemed to imply that partial sanctioning was ineffective as a method of securing customers' participation in work programs.

Full family sanctioning had not generally been an option under prior federal law. Thus, there was little historical evidence from which Maryland could predict the magnitude of sanctioning which might occur, the type of sanctioning (work or child support) that might predominate, the characteristics of those who would be sanctioned and what would happen to families on whom this stringent penalty might be imposed.

Today's report is the first of several reports that will address these important questions about sanctioning and sanctioned families. Certainly, the findings presented herein should be viewed as preliminary rather than final, suggestive rather than definitive. Findings from these early months of reform may be reflective of what the

trends will be over time, but then again they may not be. With regard to sanctions, as is true with regard to welfare reform more generally, it remains much too early to tell what the final outcomes will be. At least during the first 18 months of Maryland's first-ever experience with full family sanctioning, however, these early data suggest the policy has been working as intended. Sanctions are used relatively infrequently and they are generally successful in the sense that most adults in sanctioned cases either find jobs or comply with program rules and return to cash assistance.

At the same time, these early findings do suggest that continued concern about and research attention to sanctioning and sanctioned families is warranted. Though sanctioned and non-sanctioned welfare leavers are similar in some ways, there are some characteristics on which their profiles are significantly different. Of particular note are our findings that sanctioned families fare poorly when compared to non-sanctioned families on post-exit employment and earnings and that younger payees, those with little or no work experience or a history of early child-bearing appear to be those most likely to be sanctioned. Arguably, these are also the types of families who might be less apt to have other sources of support available to them and/or be those who, even in this strong economy, find it difficult to sustain employment.

These emerging profile and outcome data suggest that it may be possible to incorporate sanction-related risk factors into agencies' front-line client assessment activities. Similarly, more intensive prevention or conciliation activities with high-risk customers might also be a worthwhile strategy to consider. Admittedly, however, it is still very early in the history of full family sanctioning and, at least based on Maryland's

experiences during the first 18 months, there do not appear to be any pressing needs for reform in the state's use of this new, more stringent penalty. Nonetheless, for program monitoring purposes, continued attention to this area of welfare reform practice is warranted. It is important to track what happens to sanctioned families over an extended period of time, to monitor sanctioning rates and patterns at the state and local levels, and to continue to examine how sanctioned and non-sanctioned families are similar or dissimilar. Activities such as these are essential because, as noted by a senior official at the National Conference of State Legislatures:

Many questions remain unanswered...one set of questions we have little information about involves families who leave welfare because of sanctions or time limits. Most of what we know includes them as part of the larger group of families that leave welfare. We do not have a good picture of whether the difficulties they face are greater or different...we need to work with existing studies to pull out what information is available as well as design studies that will quickly provide us with a better understanding of these families and that will alert us to potential problems in time to respond to those problems (Tweedie, 1999).

Through its ongoing, longitudinal study of welfare leavers, *Life After Welfare*, Maryland has demonstrated its commitment to aggressively use research to shape, improve and continuously monitor public welfare policy. Today's report builds on that commitment by providing policy-makers with empirical information about one specific policy, full family sanctioning, and its use and effects during the first 18 months of reform.

Appendix A. Sanctioning Policy in Maryland

Under What Circumstances is a Full Family Sanction Imposed?

- " When an adult fails to cooperate with work requirements.
- " When an adult fails to cooperate with child support requirements (e.g. assigning their support rights to the state or providing information to assist the state in establishing or enforcing a child support order).
- " When an adult fails to give consent for release of confidential alcohol and drug treatment information at redetermination.
- " When an adult commits an intentional program violation **after** October 1, 1996 and is convicted **after** October 1, 1996 (or signs a waiver of the right to administrative disqualification hearing).

Under What Circumstances are Partial or Individual Sanctions Imposed?

- " When a school-age child (age 16 - 18) who is not the head of household, is not in school and is not in compliance with work requirements their portion of the grant is removed.
- " When an adult refuses to participate or fails to comply with the requirements of a substance abuse treatment program their portion of the grant is removed. Because the sanctioned individual remains part of the household, they are subject to work requirements, and at risk of full family sanction if they fail to meet the work requirements. If the adult is the head of household, the grant for the rest of the household will be paid to a third-party representative.
- " When an adult or minor parent fails to keep the initial health screening with a managed care organization their needs are deducted from the grant.
- " When an adult commits an intentional program violation **prior** to October 1, 1996 and is convicted **after** October 1, 1996 (or signs a waiver of the right to administrative disqualification hearing) their needs are removed from the calculation of the grant.
- " When children in the household do not meet the 80% school attendance requirement, or and adult does not provide proof of immunizations and preventive health check-ups for the children in the household.²⁴

²⁴ This sanction is a partial sanction and not an individual sanction. A \$25 disallowance is imposed for each child who does not meet school attendance or immunization requirements.

What Conciliation Periods Exist?


- " Customers are entitled to 30-day conciliation periods as follows:
 - one** 30-day period for non-compliance with child support requirements.
 - one** 30-day period for non-compliance with work requirements.
 - one** 30-day period for non-compliance with substance abuse provisions.

- " Local departments may extend the conciliation period if the customer wants to comply, but cannot comply within the 30 days through no fault of their own.

- " Customers with an intentional program violation (IPV) are **not** entitled to the conciliation process.

- " Good cause must be investigated regardless of the number of instances of non-compliance.

Appendix B. Map of Maryland



Appendix C. Sanctioning over Time in Individual Jurisdictions

**Table C-1.
Allegany County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=343)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=317)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=162)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=822)
Closing Code Available	325	306	162	793
Sanction Status**				
Non-Sanctioned	91.1% (296)	89.2% (273)	81.5% (132)	88.4% (701)
Sanctioned	8.9% (29)	10.8% (33)	18.5% (30)	11.6% (92)
Type of Sanction				
Work	8.9% (29)	10.8% (33)	18.5% (30)	11.6% (92)
Child Support	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-2.
Anne Arundel County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=1,041)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=907)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=975)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=2,923)
Closing Code Available	1,041	884	973	2,898
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	98.0% (1,020)	92.5% (818)	91.9% (894)	94.3% (2,732)
Sanctioned	2.0% (21)	7.5% (66)	8.1% (79)	5.7% (166)
Type of Sanction				
Work	1.8% (19)	6.7% (59)	7.9% (77)	5.3% (155)
Child Support	0.2% (2)	0.8% (7)	0.2% (2)	0.4% (11)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-3.
Baltimore County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=2,480)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=2,509)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=1,657)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=6,646)
Closing Code Available	2,429	2,419	1,654	6,502
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	89.9% (2,184)	84.8% (2,051)	80.6% (1,333)	85.6% (5,568)
Sanctioned	10.1% (245)	15.2% (368)	19.4% (321)	14.4% (934)
Type of Sanction				
Work	9.3% (227)	14.1% (342)	18.3% (302)	18.3% (871)
Child Support	0.7% (18)	1.1% (26)	1.1% (19)	1.1% (63)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-4.
Calvert County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=190)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=208)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=124)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=522)
Closing Code Available	180	198	124	502
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	91.7% (165)	74.2% (147)	76.6% (95)	81.1% (407)
Sanctioned	8.3% (15)	25.8% (51)	23.4% (29)	18.9% (95)
Type of Sanction				
Work	6.7% (12)	24.2% (48)	20.2% (25)	16.9% (85)
Child Support	1.7% (3)	1.5% (3)	3.2% (4)	2.0% (10)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-5.
Caroline County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/9 6-3/97 (N=122)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=163)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=91)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=376)
Closing Code Available	109	158	91	358
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	97.2% (106)	91.8% (145)	82.4% (75)	91.1% (326)
Sanctioned	2.8% (3)	8.2% (13)	17.6% (16)	8.9% (32)
Type of Sanction				
Work	2.8% (3)	8.2% (13)	16.5% (15)	8.7% (31)
Child Support	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	1.1% (1)	0.3% (1)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-6.
Carroll County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=252)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=228)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=133)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=613)
Closing Code Available	246	222	133	601
Sanction Status*				
Non-Sanctioned	93.5% (230)	86.9% (193)	85.7% (114)	89.4% (537)
Sanctioned	6.5% (16)	13.1% (29)	14.3% (19)	10.6% (64)
Type of Sanction				
Work	24.5% (12)	9.9% (22)	11.3% (15)	8.2% (49)
Child Support	1.6% (4)	3.2% (7)	3.0% (4)	2.5% (15)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-7.
Cecil County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=337)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=337)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=179)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=853)
Closing Code Available	323	317	179	819
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	93.8% (303)	82.0% (260)	83.8% (150)	87.1% (713)
Sanctioned	6.2% (20)	18.0% (57)	16.2% (29)	12.9% (106)
Type of Sanction				
Work	5.6% (18)	16.1% (51)	15.6% (28)	11.8% (97)
Child Support	0.6% (2)	1.9% (6)	0.6% (1)	1.1% (9)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-8.
Charles County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=488)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=379)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=280)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=1,147)
Closing Code Available	470	353	279	1,102
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	86.0% (404)	75.6% (267)	87.1% (243)	82.9% (914)
Sanctioned	14.0% (66)	24.4% (86)	12.9% (36)	17.1% (188)
Type of Sanction				
Work	13.4% (63)	22.1% (78)	10.0% (28)	15.3% (169)
Child Support	0.6% (3)	2.3% (8)	2.9% (8)	1.7% (19)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-9.
Dorchester County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=234)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=255)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=114)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=603)
Closing Code Available	219	246	1133	578
Sanction Status**				
Non-Sanctioned	93.6% (205)	88.6% (218)	81.4% (92)	89.1% (515)
Sanctioned	6.4% (14)	11.4% (28)	18.6% (21)	10.9% (63)
Type of Sanction				
Work	4.1% (9)	10.2% (25)	18.6% (21)	9.5% (55)
Child Support	2.3% (5)	1.2% (3)	0.0% (0)	1.4% (8)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-10.
Frederick County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=535)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=292)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=168)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=995)
Closing Code Available	513	273	167	953
Sanction Status**				
Non-Sanctioned	94.7% (486)	88.3% (241)	91.0% (152)	92.2% (879)
Sanctioned	5.3% (27)	11.7% (32)	9.0% (15)	7.8% (74)
Type of Sanction				
Work	5.3% (27)	11.7% (32)	9.0% (15)	7.8% (74)
Child Support	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-11.
Garrett County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=121)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=90)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=68)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=279)
Closing Code Available	111	88	68	267
Sanction Status				
Non-Sanctioned	83.8% (93)	92.0% (81)	94.1% (64)	89.1% (238)
Sanctioned	16.2% (18)	8.0% (7)	5.9% (4)	10.9% (29)
Type of Sanction				
Work	16.2% (18)	8.0% (7)	5.9% (4)	10.9% (29)
Child Support	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-12.
Harford County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=545)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=514)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=292)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=1,351)
Closing Code Available	523	492	292	1,307
Sanction Status				
Non-Sanctioned	92.5% (484)	89.4% (440)	91.8% (268)	91.2% (1,192)
Sanctioned	7.5% (39)	10.6% (52)	8.2% (24)	8.5% (115)
Type of Sanction				
Work	6.1% (32)	8.9% (44)	6.8% (20)	7.3% (96)
Child Support	1.3% (7)	1.6% (8)	1.4% (4)	1.5% (19)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-13.
Howard County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=441)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=333)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=195)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=969)
Closing Code Available	424	317	1,195	936
Sanction Status				
Non-Sanctioned	86.1% (365)	82.6% (262)	87.7% (171)	85.3% (798)
Sanctioned	13.9% (59)	17.4% (55)	12.3% (24)	14.7% (138)
Type of Sanction				
Work	12.0% (51)	15.1% (48)	10.3% (20)	12.7% (119)
Child Support	1.9% (8)	2.2% (7)	2.1% (4)	2.0% (19)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-14.
Kent County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=89)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=50)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=22)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=161)
Closing Code Available	85	47	22	154
Sanction Status				
Non-Sanctioned	87.1% (74)	97.9% (46)	86.4% (19)	90.3% (139)
Sanctioned	12.9% (11)	2.1% (1)	13.6% (3)	9.7% (15)
Type of Sanction				
Work	11.8% (10)	2.1% (1)	9.1% (2)	8.4% (13)
Child Support	1.2% (1)	0.0% (0)	4.5% (1)	1.3% (2)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-15.
Montgomery County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=1,399)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=1,322)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=856)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=3,577)
Closing Code Available	1,314	1,226	854	3,394
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	97.9% (1,287)	97.7% (1,198)	92.2% (787)	96.4% (3,272)
Sanctioned	2.1% (27)	2.3% (28)	7.8% (67)	3.6% (122)
Type of Sanction***				
Work	1.1% (15)	0.3% (4)	5.0% (43)	1.8% (62)
Child Support	0.9% (12)	2.0% (24)	2.8% (24)	1.8% (60)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table C-16.
Prince George s County

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=2,765)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=4,235)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=3,207)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=10,207)
Closing Code Available	2,739	4,075	3,198	10,0012
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	99.1% (2,714)	92.7% (3,779)	89.6% (2,867)	93.5% (9,360)
Sanctioned	0.9% (25)	7.3% (296)	10.4% (331)	6.5% (652)
Type of Sanction				
Work	0.8% (23)	6.6% (268)	8.9% (286)	5.8% (577)
Child Support	0.1% (2)	0.7% (28)	1.4% (45)	0.7% (75)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table C-17.
Queen Anne s County

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=83)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=87)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=50)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=220)
Closing Code Available	80	85	50	215
Sanction Status				
Non-Sanctioned	82.5% (66)	90.6% (77)	96.0% (48)	88.8% (191)
Sanctioned	17.5% (14)	9.4% (8)	4.0% (2)	11.2% (24)
Type of Sanction				
Work	13.8% (11)	7.1% (6)	4.0% (2)	8.8% (19)
Child Support	3.8% (3)	2.4% (2)	0.0% (0)	2.3% (5)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table C-18.
Saint Mary s County

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=233)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=347)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=181)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=761)
Closing Code Available	220	342	181	743
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	99.1% (218)	79.5% (272)	95.6% (173)	89.2% (663)
Sanctioned	0.9% (2)	20.5% (70)	4.4% (8)	10.8% (80)
Type of Sanction				
Work	0.5% (1)	17.0% (58)	2.8% (5)	8.6% (64)
Child Support	0.5% (1)	3.5% (12)	1.7% (3)	2.2% (16)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-19.
Somerset County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=170)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=212)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=85)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=467)
Closing Code Available	161	208	85	454
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	90.1% (145)	74.0% (154)	69.4% (59)	78.9% (358)
Sanctioned	9.9% (16)	26.0% (54)	30.6% (26)	21.1% (96)
Type of Sanction				
Work	9.9% (16)	25.5% (53)	30.6% (26)	20.9% (95)
Child Support	0.0% (0)	0.5% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.2% (1)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-20.
Talbot County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=113)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=94)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=39)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=246)
Closing Code Available	103	90	39	232
Sanction Status*				
Non-Sanctioned	99.0% (102)	91.1% (82)	92.3% (36)	94.8% (220)
Sanctioned	1.0% (1)	8.9% (8)	7.7% (3)	5.2% (12)
Type of Sanction				
Work	1.0% (1)	7.8% (7)	7.7% (3)	4.7% (11)
Child Support	0.0% (0)	1.1% (1)	0.0% (0)	0.4% (1)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-21.
Washington County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=679)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=382)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=236)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=1,297)
Closing Code Available	627	357	235	1,219
Sanction Status				
Non-Sanctioned	88.8% (557)	86.3% (308)	88.5% (208)	88.0% (1,073)
Sanctioned	11.2% (70)	13.7% (49)	11.5% (27)	12.0% (146)
Type of Sanction				
Work	10.7% (67)	11.8% (42)	10.6% (25)	11.0% (134)
Child Support	0.5% (3)	2.0% (7)	0.9% (2)	1.0% (12)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-22.
Wicomico County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=497)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=598)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=325)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=1,420)
Closing Code Available	478	575	324	1,377
Sanction Status**				
Non-Sanctioned	98.5% (471)	93.7% (539)	95.7% (310)	95.9% (1,320)
Sanctioned	1.5% (7)	6.3% (36)	4.3% (14)	4.1% (57)
Type of Sanction				
Work	0.6% (3)	3.8% (22)	3.4% (11)	2.6% (36)
Child Support	0.8% (4)	2.4% (14)	0.9% (3)	1.5% (21)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-23.
Worcester County**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=173)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=178)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=86)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=437)
Closing Code Available	167	173	86	426
Sanction Status*				
Non-Sanctioned	89.8% (150)	91.3% (158)	80.2% (69)	88.5% (377)
Sanctioned	10.2% (17)	8.7% (15)	19.8% (17)	11.5% (49)
Type of Sanction				
Work	10.2% (17)	6.9% (12)	19.8% (17)	10.8% (46)
Child Support	0.0% (0)	1.7% (3)	0.0% (0)	0.7% (3)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

**Table C-24.
Baltimore City**

	Exiting Cohort 10/96-3/97 (N=7,858)	Exiting Cohort 4/97-9/97 (N=5,978)	Exiting Cohort 10/97-3/98 (N=5,682)	All Cohorts 10/96-3/98 (N=19,518)
Closing Code Available	7,858	5,979	5,669	19,505
Sanction Status***				
Non-Sanctioned	98.9% (7,775)	96.7% (5,782)	95.8% (5,433)	97.4% (18,990)
Sanctioned	1.1% (83)	3.3% (196)	4.2% (236)	2.6% (515)
Type of Sanction**				
Work	1.0% (79)	3.1% (188)	3.7% (208)	2.4% (475)
Child Support	0.1% (4)	0.1% (8)	0.5% (28)	0.2% (40)

Note: * p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

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